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Abstract 
Using homogenous firm-level data for the largest Member States of the EU over the period 2007-
2009, we test whether manufacturing firms receiving R&D public supports (subsidies and/or tax 
incentives) spent more on R&D. The analysis is performed by means of both non-parametric 
(Propensity Score Matching) and parametric estimations (OLS and mixed-model system, with the 
latter accounting for the possible endogeneity of public supports). The hypothesis of full crowding-
out of private with public funds (i.e. public support reduced privately-funded R&D expenses) is 
rejected for all countries, with the partial exception of Spain. However, we do not find evidence for 
the hypothesis of additionality of R&D subsidies (i.e. direct funding did not raise private R&D). 
These findings contrast with earlier works and might be due to the period under assessment, which 
covers the financial turmoil and the subsequent economic downturn. A focused analysis on France 
suggests that R&D tax credits exerted a positive impact on R&D. Overall, our findings indicate that, 
albeit they were not expansive, public supports avoided the reduction of firm R&D at the outset of 
financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the nature of R&D investment and its crucial role for economic growth, public policies to 
foster business R&D have been increasingly adopted world-widely, especially by developed 
countries. In the latest years, numerous firm-level studies have investigated the effectiveness of 
these policies, but only a slight majority of these works have documented positive effects on 
business R&D (see Zùniga-Vicente et al., 2014; Becker, 2014). The ambiguity of results is partly 
due to the large array of policy instruments that can be adopted to promote R&D (subsidies, tax 
incentives, public procurements, etc.), to the alternative objectives of such policies (increase in 
R&D investment, patents, productivity of R&D performing firms) and to the fact that different 
micro-econometric methods have been used for evaluating such measures. Moreover, results do 
vary because of the different time periods analyzed, the control variables used in estimation and, 
last but not least, the heterogeneity in the quality of the governmental agencies managing such 
public programmes.  
The present paper assesses the effectiveness of R&D policies by using homogenous firm-level data 
for the largest Member States of the European Union: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. 
Such a cross-country comparability makes our empirical study almost unique2. Our aim is of testing 
whether firms receiving public supports to R&D, either in the form of direct subsidies or tax 
allowances, spent more on research. We use novel data for nation-wide representative (cross-
sectional) samples of manufacturing firms from a survey (European Firms in the Global Economy-
EU EFIGE survey) carried out in the aftermath of the financial crisis, covering the period 2007-
2009. The database offers a plenty of information about firm characteristics and contextual factors 
influencing the company’s choice to undertake R&D projects and to exploit public support to 
perform such activities. This reduces the risk of the estimation bias associated with the cross-
sectional nature of the data which, clearly, limits the possibility to account for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity or for the persistent nature of the firm engagement in R&D and of the usage of R&D 
public supports. Another crucial feature of the paper is that of adopting an array of methods that 
permit to address the main econometric issues involved in policy evaluation analyses. We first 
adopt a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) procedure. As public R&D supports are not distributed 
randomly, this methodology is adequate to address the problem of “selection on observables”. 
However, to account for the potential biases associated with the “selection on unobservables”, we 
also carry out a parametric regression analysis based on OLS and a conditional mixed-model system 
estimated with the maximum likelihood method. The latter procedure addresses the possible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The only micro-econometric study providing cross-country comparisons of the impact exerted by public subsidies on 
firm R&D intensities is Czarnitzki, and Lopes Bento (2012). In this case, however, the authors use a much narrow set 
control variables that, although similar, were collected by means of different national surveys.     
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simultaneity (endogeneity) between the firm propensity to invest in R&D and to benefit from R&D 
public supports. It consists in a simultaneous system composed by an equation for R&D 
performance (i.e. the outcome variable) and an equation for the receipt of a public support (i.e. the 
treatment variable). The impact of the latter variable is predicted exploiting variation in some 
structural and institutional characteristics of the regions in which the firms are located. Our analysis 
is therefore able to overcome the main sources of heterogeneity and the key econometric concerns 
affecting most empirical works.  
In the analysis, we distinguish between firms getting direct funding and those exploiting tax 
incentives and consider two measures of outcome, namely gross and net R&D expenditure on sales. 
This allows us to assess the hypothesis of full or partial crowding-out (i.e. R&D policy did raise 
gross research intensity) and the hypothesis of crowding-in/additionality (i.e. R&D policy did raise 
net research intensity). The hypothesis of full crowding-out can be rejected for all countries, 
irrespective of the procedure of analysis used. It makes exception Spain because, for this country, 
we do not find any relation between R&D support and R&D intensity (gross and net), after 
accounting for endogeneity of the policy variable. However, public subsidies do not appear to 
induce firms to spend additional (own) resources on R&D and, therefore, we reject the hypothesis 
of additionality of this policy instrument for all countries. Conversely, albeit confined to Spain and 
France due to data limitations, the analysis on the effectiveness of R&D tax credit indicates that 
only in France this policy instrument had a significant positive effect on business R&D. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical literature, illustrating the 
nature of R&D public supports adopted by the EU countries under examination. Section 3 describes 
the variables employed in the analysis. In Section 4 we perform PSM and parametric estimates for 
the effect of public support on total R&D intensity, without distinguishing between direct subsidies 
and fiscal incentives. This represents a test for the hypothesis of full crowding-out. In Section 5 we 
employ the intensity of private R&D expenditures (net of public subsidies) as outcome variable, so 
to provide a test for the additionality hypothesis. In Section 6 we assess the effect of R&D tax 
credits (limited to France and Spain). Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and concludes.  
 
2.Estimating the impact of public incentives on business R&D: A brief survey 
Public policies to support private R&D efforts are justified by the presence of market failures which 
make private returns on R&D investments lower than their social value. Due to their public nature, 
most research outcomes are difficult to appropriate and, hence, private firms invest in R&D less 
than would be socially desirable. Market failures also arise because research projects are highly 
risky and R&D performing firms find it particularly difficult to obtain external funding, such as 
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bank credit, to support these tasks. As a result, R&D active firms have to rely mainly upon self-
financing. 
While the rationale for R&D policies is widely recognized, there is less agreement among 
economists on their actual effectiveness, due to the ambiguity of the results of empirical analyses. 
Firstly, findings often change with the firm performance under assessment, i.e. the policy 
beneficiaries may increase innovation inputs (R&D expenditures), innovation outputs (e.g. patents) 
or economic performance (e.g. productivity). Secondly, different policy instruments, such as R&D 
subsidies, tax allowances, public procurements, or incentives to collaborative research, may affect 
the company outcome in a different extent. In the following, we shall focus on R&D subsidies and 
tax credits while, with respect to the policy objective, attention will be confined to the increase of 
R&D efforts by private companies. 
The main difficulty in evaluating R&D (as well as other) policies is due to presence of selectivity 
biases. In fact, companies benefiting from public supports are not chosen randomly: first of all, they 
must apply for research subsidy or tax credit programmes and, hence, a self-selection process may 
take place. Then, beneficiaries of R&D subsidies are selected by a public agency among several 
applicants. Furthermore, also for tax incentives, there is no guarantee that supported companies will 
perform additional research activities as these firms may opportunistically substitute public grants 
for their own funds (crowding-out hypothesis). 
To overcome these selectivity problems, studies aimed at assessing the effectiveness of public 
support to business R&D have used different methods. The most diffused approach is the Matching 
procedure. This is a non-parametric method which evaluates whether the mean difference of R&D 
expenditures (or their intensity on total sales) between firms getting public support and unsupported 
firms -identified on the basis of some common observable characteristics- can be ascribed to the 
policy treatment. A parametric method providing estimates consistent with the Matching procedure 
is OLS regression, in which firm R&D expenditure (or intensity) is related to some variables 
indicating whether the company has been publicly supported in research activities, as well as to 
other observable covariates influencing both the R&D behavior of the company and the decisional 
process of the agency awarding R&D grants. However, in the presence of unobservable 
characteristics affecting the likelihood of receiving a public support, these two methods yield biased 
estimates. Parametric approaches circumventing the ‘selection on unobservables’ problem, which 
makes public supports potentially endogenous to firm R&D efforts, are the Selection model, 
Instrumental-variables (IV) and the Difference-in-differences (DID) regressions3. The potential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a review of the different micro-econometric methods for estimating the effect of public supports on business R&D 
see Cerulli (2010).  
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advantage of these methods is offset by their requirement of additional distributional assumptions 
(the Selection model), the availability of exogenous instruments or identification variables (IV 
regression) or of longitudinal data (DID method).                    
The literature on effectiveness of R&D subsidies is very extensive and has been surveyed by several 
papers. According to García-Quevedo (2004) and, more recently, Zùniga-Vicente et al. (2014), 
almost half of the micro-econometric studies support the additionality hypothesis for advanced 
countries; in other words, subsidized firms have increased their R&D expenditures more than the 
amount of public subsidy received. About one fourth of the firm-level analyses have detected the 
presence of crowding-out effects while, in the remaining 25%, public subsidies are not found to 
generate additional privately-funded R&D expenses but the hypothesis of full crowding-out is 
rejected.  
 
Table 1: Firm-level studies on the impact of R&D subsidies in some European countries 
 Country Outcome variable: 
R&D expenses or 
intensity on sales  
Method Results 
Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) Germany (East) Total Matching Full crowding-out rejected 
Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) Germany (East) Total Matching Full crowding-out rejected 
Hussinger (2008) Germany  Private  Selection model Additionality 
Hud and Hussinger (2014) Germany  Private Matching Additionaliy 
Busom (2000)  Spain Total  Selection model Full crowding-out rejected 
Gonzalez et al. (2005)  Spain Private 	   IV Full crowding-out rejected 
González and Pazó (2008)  Spain Private 	   Matching Full crowding-out rejected 
Duguet (2004)  France Private 	   Matching Additionality  
Carboni (2011) Italy Private 	   Matching 
Selection model 
Additionaly 
Barbieri et al. (2012) Italy Total 	   DID Full crowding-out rejected 
Cerulli and Potì (2012a) Italy Total 	   Matching Full crowding-out rejected 
Cerulli and Potì (2012b) Itay Total 	   Matching 
Selection Model 
DID 
Full crowding-out rejected 
 
Table 1 details recent firm-level studies on the impact of R&D subsidies in the European countries 
covered by the present paper. Due to the lack of data on the amount of subsidies obtained by each 
company, half of these studies consider total R&D expenditure (or intensities) as outcome variable; 
as a consequence, they cannot test the additionality hypothesis but only that of full crowding-out. 
The latter hypothesis is rejected by most studies whereas, in four cases out of twelve, R&D 
subsidies have increased privately-funded R&D effort. Conversely, the crowding-out hypothesis is 
never accepted4. In summary, the latest firm-level evidence for the major EU countries indicates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4For Spain, there is no evidence of additionality, neither of full crowding-out. For Italy, two studies have applied 
different estimation procedures on the same data set, finding consistent results: additionality in Carboni (2011) and 
rejection of full crowding-out in Cerulli and Potì (2012b).	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that public subsidies have positively affected business R&D, although only in a minority of cases 
private research efforts grew more than the amount of R&D grants received by the companies. 
Whilst R&D subsidies are targeted to raise the private marginal return of R&D, in order to fill the 
gap with the social returns of such activities, tax incentives reduce the cost of doing research (David 
et al. 2000). The main advantage of R&D tax credits is of not altering the firm choice about the 
R&D projects to develop, and of avoiding the bias associated with the selection of R&D projects to 
be funded by the public agency.  
The main practice for assessing the effectiveness R&D tax credit is to estimate an R&D demand 
equation in which research expenses (or their intensity on sales) are assumed to co-vary with the tax 
price component of R&D capital user cost (which is inversely related to R&D tax credit) and with 
some proxies for the firm expected sales (typically current sales or value added).   
This analysis was originally implemented on firm-level data by mainly focussing on US companies 
(Eisner et al. 1986). More recently, it has been extended to industry- and economy-wide level data, 
covering numerous countries (Bloom et al 2002). Thomson (2013) describes the diffusion of fiscal 
incentives (and differences in such practices) across OECD countries. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) 
discuss characteristics and problems associated with R&D tax credit, surveying the earlier micro-
econometric literature. A more recent overview of such studies can be found in Becker (2014) and 
Castellacci and Mee Lie (2015). Through a meta-regression analysis, the latter work shows that this 
policy instrument is more effective for small firms, service companies and those active in low-tech 
industries. From this literature it emerges that, on average, a one-percent increase in R&D tax credit 
raises R&D expenses by around 0.20-0.30% in the short run, and between 1 and 2% in the long run 
(CPB et al. 2014, p. 20). See, among others, Duguet (2012) and Mulkey and Mairesse (2013) for 
France, and Cantabene and Nascia (2014) for Italy.  
 
3. Data base and variables’ description 
Our study exploits the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit (henceforth EFIGE) dataset, which collects 
survey data for a representative sample of manufacturing firms belonging to seven EU countries for 
the period 2007-2009 (Altomonte and Aquilante, 2012)5. Our attention is restricted to the largest 
countries included in the sample, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and the UK; together, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The database was collected within the EFIGE project (European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for 
external competitiveness) supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commission through its 7th 
Framework Programme and coordinated by Bruegel. The original sample was identified along three dimensions of 
stratification: industries (11 NACE-CLIO industry codes), regions (at the NUTS-1 level of aggregation) and size class 
(10-19; 20-49; 50-250; more than 250 employees). The survey was conducted in 2010. 
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according to Eurostat data, they accounted for 73% of business R&D expenses of the EU in the 
period under exam.  
 
3.1 Extent of publicly supported firms and types of R&D supports among countries 
Table 2 illustrates the number of firms sampled in the five countries considered and of those 
reporting a positive share of R&D expenditures on total sales, over the period 2007-20096. 
Excluding Spain, in all the countries more than half of the firms are active in R&D.  
 
Table 2: Firms performing R&D and benefiting from R&D supports by country 
  France  Germany Italy Spain UK Total 
Number of firms 2961 2924 3007 2765 1989 13646 
Firms doing R&D 1488 1539 1644 1195 1040 6906 
Percentage of firms doing R&D 50.25 52.63 54.67 43.22 52.29 50.61 
Firms with R&D supports 550 268 568 495 292 2173 
Percentage of firms with R&D supports 
(on R&D active firms) 
36.96 17.41 34.55 41.42 28.08 31.47 
Source: own computation from the EFIGE data base 
The policy or “treatment” variable of our study is a dummy identifying those firms that received in 
the years 2007-2009 some public supports to R&D, either in the form of direct subsidies or R&D 
tax credits, irrespective of the nature of the agency or institution awarding these incentives 
(regional, national, etc.)7. The two forms of R&D support are not distinguished so that we do not 
know explicitly if firms benefitted from R&D subsidies, tax credits or both. On aggregate, 31% of 
R&D performing firms received some public supports for their research activities. This confirms 
that public measures to sustain business R&D have been extensively adopted across European 
countries and, thus, their effectiveness needs to be carefully examined (CBP et al. 2014; OECD 
2011a and 2011b).  
There are remarkable differences among countries in terms of percentage of supported firms: this 
share is particularly high in Spain, followed by France and Italy, while it is lower in the UK and 
Germany. These discrepancies are mainly due to the different policy measures pursued by EU 
countries. Germany is the only country not offering R&D tax incentives, and this is the main reason 
why its share of publicly supported firms is the lower than elsewhere. In Germany, R&D incentives 
are mostly in the form of non-repayable cash grants which are allocated by numerous programmes. 
Direct funding is provided by the federal government and the individual states (Länder), whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6We excluded a few companies that reported anomalous or unreliable R&D intensity ratios exceeding 50% of total 
sales. 
7 The specific query of the questionnaire was “Did the firm benefit from tax allowances and financial incentives for 
these R&D activities?”. 
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schemes are generally targeted to SMEs. R&D loans or guarantees are alternative to subsidies and 
are offered by both federal and German states’ development banks8.  
In the UK, direct subsidies are by far less diffused than fiscal incentives; the latter represent the 
largest instrument for supporting business R&D, accounting for 75% of the government budget 
allocated to innovation support schemes. Fiscal policies are implemented through a deduction from 
corporation tax liability for R&D expenditures. In 2008-2009 the scheme allowed SMEs to deduct 
up to 150% of their qualifying expenditures on R&D, while the maximum deduction for larger 
companies was set to 130%. The number of firms claiming the R&D tax relief was 7,580 in the 
financial year 2007-2008, and increased to 9,180 in 2009-2010 (HM Revenue & Customs, 2014). 
In Italy, direct subsidies to business R&D are provided by the central government through the 
Ministry of Research’s funding scheme (FAR) and by regional governments (especially for co-
financing the European Regional Development Fund). In addition to R&D subsidies, a tax credit 
proportional to the volume of business R&D expenditures was introduced in 2007 (Cantabene and 
Nascia, 2014). The tax credit amounts to 10% for investments in own research projects, and to 40% 
for projects in collaboration with universities and public R&D labs. In 2007, 12,446 Italian firms 
exploited the fiscal incentive. Then, to avoid the overshooting of the planned budget, the Italian 
government introduced a selection procedure based upon a “first to apply” rule and, as a 
consequence, the number of firms obtaining the tax deduction declined to 10,069 in 2008 and 5,193 
in 2009. 
In France, the generosity of direct funding to business R&D has not changed remarkably since the 
mid-2000s, while that of research tax credits has dramatically increased. In 2008, direct subsidies 
and fiscal incentives accounted for 12% and 18% of total private R&D, respectively. Foregone tax 
liabilities increased from €1.8bn in 2007 to €4.7bn in 2009. Since 2008 a new, more generous 
regime of tax credit has been introduced, which is based on the volume of R&D expenditures and 
establishes a 30% rate of tax reduction (up to a threshold of €100m). French companies benefiting 
from the tax credit increased to 9,760 units in 2008 and to 11,625 in 20099. 
Finally, in Spain, tax incentives and direct supports (subsidies and loans) have been both available 
since the 1980s, although a major legal change increasing tax incentives was introduced in 1995 
(Busom et al., 2012). The tax credit is a combination of incremental and volume based systems, by 
allowing deductions from corporate taxable income (100% of current R&D expenditures) and 
deductions from the firm’s tax liability. Direct subsidies from central government are mostly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8Such information is taken from GTAI (Germany Trade & Invest), the economic development agency of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (see www.gtai.de).	  
9See Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (2011). 
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channeled through a public agency providing grants and loans. Firms benefiting from these 
incentives are less numerous than those exploiting tax credits. Further schemes of direct R&D 
funding are provided by regional governments. 
 
3.2Observable characteristics of R&D performing firms  
In the analysis, we account for a large set of firm characteristics and use them to predict either the 
propensity to obtain R&D support or the intensity of R&D engagement. A detailed definition of the 
explanatory variables is reported in Table 3. 
We control for whether the attitude to engage in R&D, or to apply for R&D public support, changes 
with the company age (Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2013). Specifically, we include a dummy 
variable for companies with 20 and more years from establishment, that we label as old aged 
firms10.	  
Firm size is accounted for by a categorical variable taking values from 1 to 3, in relation to whether 
the company has less than 50 employees, between 50 and 249 employees, and 250 and more 
workers. 
Group affiliation is differentiated according to the nationality of the headquarters (domestic or 
foreign). This condition should determine the amount of resources available to engage in R&D for 
affiliated firms, as well as it should influence their capacity to route the procedure for obtaining 
R&D public support (González et al., 2005; Hussinger, 2008).  
We also differentiate EU firms on the basis of their status of direct exporter (i.e. whether they sell 
abroad their products directly from the home country in 2009) and on whether they have been 
awarded with a certification for the quality of their products or processes. Moreover, we roughly 
discriminate firms according to the nature of their management, using a dummy variable for those 
that are run by individual holders. These firms are likely to better evaluate risks and returns of 
innovation, avoiding the risk of misalignment of incentives between managers and owners (Driver 
and Guedes, 2012; Honorè et al., 2015). 
We explicitly assess the role of the firm financial conditions by means of two dummies. First, we 
control for the financial structure of the firm looking at whether it mainly rests on bank credit as a 
mean to finance its activities. For most EU firms, bank credit is the main tool for accessing external 
finance. In addition, we inspect whether the credit crunch transmitted to R&D performance by 
reducing the supply of bank credit, inducing firms to demand for more public support. To this aim, 
we construct a binary variable for those companies that applied for extra credit in 2009 but did not 
obtain it. This variable provides a direct measure of financial constraints and allows to assess the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 EFIGE classifies firm age into three classes: 0-6 years, 7-19 years, 20 and more years. 
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impact of reduced credit availability on firm performance in the aftermath of the crisis. Mancusi and 
Vezzulli (2014) show that credit constraints mainly affect the firm’s decision to undertake R&D 
projects, but they have a much lower impact on the intensity of R&D efforts. However, to exclude 
that these two financial variables reflect the general worsening in the business cycle, due to a 
deterioration of firm’s expectations on future sales (which reduces the rewards to innovation), we 
use a variable indicating whether the company experienced a turnover reduction between 2008 and 
2009.	  
 
Table 3: Observable characteristics of R&D performing firms*	  
Label Type Description 
Old age dummy Equal to 1 for firms with 20 or more years from establishment; 0 
otherwise 
Size class  categorical Employment class: “Small” (less than 50 employees); “Medium” 
(between 20 and 249 employees); “Large” (more than 249 
employees) 
Individual holder dummy Equal to 1 if the firm is managed by an individual holder;  
Quality certification  dummy Equal to 1 if the firm has a quality certification; 0 otherwise 
Foreign group  dummy Equal to 1 if the firm belongs to a foreign group; 0 otherwise 
National group dummy Equal to 1 if the firms belongs to a national group; 0 otherwise 
Investment/sales  percentage Investment/total sales  
Exporter  dummy Equal to 1 if the firm is a direct exporter ; 0 otherwise 
Graduated employees percentage Share of university graduates on total employees 
Credit constraint dummy Equal to 1 for firms having applied for more credit and being 
denied; 0 otherwise 
Bank credit  dummy Equal to 1 if the firm relies on bank loans to finance their activity; 
0 otherwise 
In-house R&D  percentage Percentage of R&D made in-house  
Price taker  dummy Equal to 1 if firm’s prices that are fixed by the market; 0 otherwise 
Sales’ reduction dummy Equal to 1 if the firm has experienced sales' reduction during 2009 
in comparison with 2008; 0 otherwise 
Regional R&D intensity  percentage Regional R&D personnel on total employees 
Regional TFP  level Average TFP level of the firms located in the same region 
Convergence region 
 
dummy 
 
Equal to 1 if the firm located in NUTS2 regions classified as 
"convergence regions" for the period 2006-2013 (i.e. with less 
than 75% of the EU GDP per capita in 2004); 0 otherwise ** 
Industries  dummies Randomized EFIGE industry identifiers 
*Source: EFIGE data base. **Source= European Commission. 
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Another crucial condition that may explain firm variation in the request for R&D public support is 
the proportion of R&D performed in-house11, expressed as the percentage share of total R&D of the 
company. Firms may indeed use public support as an alternative to R&D outsourcing in order to 
overcome the financial barriers that typically affect R&D engagement.  
Along with managerial and financial resources, a further key factor influencing R&D engagement 
and the need to be publicly supported is the firm availability of a highly educated and skilled 
workforce. This is accounted for by the share of graduated employees. Clearly, human capital is 
very likely to increase the intensity of R&D engagement as it concurs to the creation of new ideas, 
new products and modes of production (Cantabene and Nascia, 2014). Though, a positive effect for 
this variable is also expected on the probability to be publicly supported (i.e., treated), for at least a 
twofold reason. Firstly, companies endowed with a highly educated workforce are better informed 
about the procedures to follow to participate to public programmes supporting R&D. Secondly, in 
case of request for direct grants, public agencies may consider firms with a highly educated 
workforce worthier to be funded as having more chances to accomplish ambitious and risky 
research projects (Busom et al., 2012). 	  
We also look at the ability of the company to increase its technological capabilities by exploiting 
technical change embodied in capital goods, approximated by the average value of the investment-
to-sales ratio between 2007 and 2009. Parisi et al. (2006) show that there could be complementarity 
between R&D engagement and investment in machinery and other equipment, especially when the 
former is devoted to develop process innovation. 	  
Finally, we consider a set of contextual variables capturing whether firm’s incentives to undertake 
R&D, or to request for R&D public support, are shaped by the competitive and technological 
setting in which the company operates. For this purpose, we consider a dummy variable identifying 
those firms acting as price-taker in the market12. We also adopt a proxy for the potential technology 
transfers that may occur among firms operating in the same area; this variable is defined as the 
average TFP level of the firms active in the same NUTS2 region where the company is located (and 
excluding the value of the reference company)13. As the latter variable may reflect only realized 
productivity improvements, we also include a proxy for the knowledge pool available at the 
regional level, that we measure by the total share of workers employed in R&D activities 
(performed by both public and business sectors). However, to discriminate EU regions on the basis 
of their economic development and, indirectly, for the different policies that may be pursued to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11In many countries and regions of the EU, R&D support programs may be conditioned on the realization of research in 
collaboration with other firms and public organizations (Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008). 
12Price-taking firms are identified as those stating that the price of their products is fixed by the market. 	  
13Firm-level TFP is made available in the EU EFIGE survey and is computed as Solow residual of a Cobb-Douglas 
output production function, estimated with the semi-parametric procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).	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increase regional competitiveness, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the region of 
the firm is classified as convergence region over the EU program period 2006-2013 (i.e. with less 
than 75% of the EU GDP per capita). In addition, all specifications include a set of industry 
dummies, to control for sectoral heterogeneity in firms’ R&D behavior14.  
 
4. Testing the hypothesis of full crowding-out 
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D supports by looking at the total R&D intensity 
of supported or “treated” firms. The latter are identified by a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if they have benefitted from direct subsidies or tax allowances for their R&D activities. At this 
initial stage, we use the share of total R&D expenses on total sales, i.e. gross of the received public 
benefit, as outcome variable. Therefore we can only test the hypothesis of full crowding-out, i.e. 
whether the treated firms reduced their private funds to R&D by an amount equal to (or even 
greater than) the public funding received. To perform such a test we employ both propensity score 
matching (PSM) and parametric estimations.  
 
4.1 PSM estimation 
We use the procedure of nearest neighbor PSM, which matches each firm that benefitted from 
public support with the most similar firm belonging to the group of non-supported companies. The 
pairs are selected on the basis of the “propensity scores” yielded by estimating a probit regression 
for the probability of receiving the treatment, i.e. R&D subsidies and/or fiscal incentives. The PSM 
compares the difference in the average R&D intensity between the supported firms and the twin 
firms extracted from the control group: such a difference represents the Average Treatment Effect 
on the Treated (ATET). The PSM procedure avoids a “curse of dimensionality” because all the 
observable characteristics (i.e. the explanatory variables of the probit regression) are summarized by 
the propensity score which is used as the single matching argument. Such a procedure relies on the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) which, in our case, means that the receipt of an R&D 
support has to be independent of the outcome indicator, conditional on the set of observable 
characteristics. As widely known, a formal test for the CIA does not exist but the employment of a 
wide set of control variables, such as that taken from the EFIGE data base, is a crucial condition for 
making this assumption to hold. 
The left section of Tables A.1-A.5 in the Appendix compares, for each country, the mean values of 
the control variables between non-supported and supported firms. With a few exceptions, the P-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14To preserve confidentiality on firm identity, the EFIGE data base provides industry identifiers in an anonymous form. 
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value of the t-tests for the mean differences indicates that there are systematic differences between 
the two groups of firms. Looking at the outcome variable (i.e., the average R&D intensity at firm 
level) we do not find significant differences between treated and un-treated firms only for Spain. 
Table 4 reports the results of the probit regression, showing large disparities across countries15. 
Only three explanatory variables (the dummy for price-taking firms, that for firms with credit 
constraints and the regional R&D intensity) turn out to be never significant at least at10% level. On 
the other hand, for the majority of countries, there are four variables that are significantly and 
positively correlated with the probability of getting R&D supports: the size of the firm; the dummy 
for firms relying almost exclusively on bank credit; the percentage of R&D carried out in-house; 
and, to a lesser extent, the dummy for firm’s export activities from the home country (see also 
Carboni, 2011; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2012 and 2013; Hud and Hussinger, 2014).  
The positive impact exerted by the intensity of in-house R&D indicates that firms that take on their 
shoulders the technological risk of R&D projects, rather than relying on external R&D, have a 
higher probability of getting R&D supports16. Similarly, companies having an almost exclusive 
reliance on bank loans suffered more the credit crunch at the outset of the financial crisis, 
demanding relatively more for R&D public support (see Carboni, 2011). These firms have also a 
structurally low capability of getting more credit to carry out additional R&D projects because, 
contrarily to investment in physical capital, R&D outlays cannot be used as collaterals in credit 
negotiations. In other words, bank credit-dependent firms are more prone to apply for public 
supports. Notice that this condition does not hold in general for all financially constrained firms, 
i.e., those that unsuccessfully demanded for more credit in the period under exam. 
The effect of firm size varies remarkably across countries. In Spain, France, and to a lower extent 
Italy, the percentage of supported firms is remarkably higher among large firms (i.e. with 250 and 
more employees) than among medium- and small-sized companies: this is probably due to the 
presence of tax incentives that do not discriminate between firms on the basis of their size. In fact, 
in Germany, R&D tax incentives are not provided and the size class recording the highest 
percentage of subsidized firms is the intermediate one. Similarly, in the UK, tax provisions for large 
firms are less generous than for SMEs (see Section 3.1). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Only for France and Germany we employ the binary variable for credit constraints because, in all the other countries, 
less than 2% of firms declared that they were unable to get more credit. The dummy identifying the location in a 
convergence region was dropped for France because in this country there are no regions of this kind. Finally, to improve 
the matching quality, we employ for Spain the interaction between the percentage of investments on total sales and the 
size of firms.  
16Hussinger (2008) and Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento (2012) employ a similar variable to capture in-house expertise for 
R&D. 
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Table 4: Results of the probit regression for the receipt of public R&D supports° 
 
France Germany Italy Spain UK 
Old age -0.085 -0.264*** -0.020 0.064 0.097 
  (0.078) (0.092) (0.072) (0.081) (0.093) 
Size class (cat.) 0.388*** 0.124** 0.362*** 0.390*** 0.039 
  (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.095) (0.080) 
Individual holder -0.388*** 0.007 0.06 -0.083 0.059 
  (0.084) (0.116) (0.098) (0.094) (0.127) 
Quality certification 0.139* 0.113 0.092 0.328*** 0.015 
  (0.079) (0.101) (0.074) (0.092) (0.103) 
Foreign group -0.216* -0.244 -0.300 0.011 -0.116 
  (0.124) (0.175) (0.185) (0.182) (0.144) 
National group -0.168* -0.077 0.027 0.211* 0.241* 
  (0.098) (0.143) (0.106) (0.123) (0.132) 
Investment/Sales (%) -0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.012* -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
(Inv/Sales)*(Size class)       0.008   
        (0.005)   
Exporter 0.464*** 0.181 0.150 0.273*** 0.473*** 
  (0.096) (0.114) (0.097) (0.103) (0.129) 
Graduated employees (%) 0.020*** 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.011*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.04) (0.003) 
Credit constraint 0.354 0.046       
  (0.248) (0.271)       
Bank credit 0.260*** 0.097 0.330*** 0.293*** 0.237** 
  (0.076) (0.096) (0.070) (0.087) (0.093) 
In-house R&D (%) 0.001 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Price taker 0.03 -0.075 0.100 0.081 0.141 
  (0.073) (0.083) (0.069) (0.091) (0.093) 
Sales’ reduction -0.136* -0.014 -0.018 -0.040 0.004 
  (0.080) (0.089) (0.079) (0.100) (0.092) 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 0.063 -0.047 0.030 0.027 0.102 
  (0.066) (0.087) (0.216) (0.141) (0.178) 
Regional TFP -0.127 -1.737*** 0.111 -0.023 0.074 
  (0.297) (0.445) (0.307) (0.283) (0.403) 
Convergence region   0.358*** -0.113 -0.257** 0.025 
    (0.139) (0.146) (0.115) (0.213) 
Constant -1.054*** -0.854*** -1.271*** -1.334*** -1.347*** 
  (0.236) (0.274) (0.312) (0.287) (0.341) 
Lratio 271.96 158.79 137.89 197.39 107.36 
Log-likelihood -844.25 -632.22 -990.80 -711.94 -563.75 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.111 0.065 0.122 0.087 
Observations 1,488 1,539 1,664 1,195 1,040 
° Industry fixed effects are not reported for the sake of brevity.  
Standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The percentage of graduated employees is significantly and positively related to the probability of 
receiving a public support for R&D for French and British firms (see Cerulli and Potì, 2012b). The 
location of a company in a “convergence region” is positively associated with this probability only 
in Germany, confirming the findings of earlier studies that firms located in the Eastern regions of 
this country are more likely to be subsidized (see Hussinger, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 
2012; Hud and Hussinger, 2014). Conversely, in Spain, the location of companies in a relatively 
developed region reduces the probability of being publicly supported in R&D. 
The estimation of the probit model for the receipt of public supports allows us to get a propensity 
score for each sampled firm. Then, we apply a nearest neighbor (NN) propensity score matching 
(PSM) and match each supported (treated) firm with a single non-supported unit (NN=1) having a 
similar propensity score. The matching procedure is implemented with replacement so that a control 
unit can be matched with different treated units. To satisfy the requirement of common support, we 
excluded treated firms with a propensity score lower than the minimum and higher than the 
maximum achieved by control firms. Moreover, to improve the quality of matching, we also impose 
a threshold (a “caliper”) to the maximum distance between treated firms and control units. If the 
distance is greater than such a threshold the treated unit is excluded17. 
The number of matched firms after the imposition of both common support and a 0.005 caliper are 
reported in the right sections of Tables A.1-A.5in the Appendix. These tables also show the mean 
value of the observable characteristics and the outcome variable both for supported and control 
firms. As a confirmation of the validity of our matching procedure, no significant differences arise 
between the treated and untreated firms after the matching for the overwhelming majority of 
observable characteristics. Conversely, significant differences remain in the mean values of the 
outcome variable. Under the CIA assumption, we can interpret these differences as Average 
Treatment Effects on the Treated, and they can be imputed to the effect of public support to 
business R&D. 
Table 5 shows that, for all countries, the estimated ATET are positive and statistically significant. In 
Italy, Spain and the UK, the results do not change when a 0.005 caliper is applied; conversely, the 
effect of public support slightly decreases in France and Germany, although remaining statistically 
significant (at a 5% level for Germany).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17According to the common support criterion we have to drop one observation for Italy, Spain and the UK and six 
observations for France. Instead, by imposing a maximum distance of 0.005 (that is a very strict threshold if one 
considers that the propensity score averaged across the five country samples is equal to 0.315), the number of excluded 
observations is much higher: 12 for Germany and the UK, 19 for Italy, 41 in the case of France and 44 for Spain.	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Table 5: Share of R&D expenditures on total sales: mean differences after the matching	  
  
Supported  
firms 
Unsupported 
firms ATET 
France  
CS  6.873 4.897 1.976*** 
CS + caliper (0.005) 6.695 4.901 1.796*** 
Germany 
CS  9.381 7.545 1.836*** 
CS + caliper (0.005) 9.184 7.574 1.609** 
Italy  
CS  7.780 5.681 2.099*** 
CS + caliper (0.005) 7.885 5.770 2.115*** 
Spain  
CS  7.229 5.360 1.869*** 
CS + caliper (0.005) 7.430 5.539 1.891*** 
UK 
CS  7.340 5.230 2.110*** 
CS + caliper (0.005) 7.254 5.196 2.058*** 
CS = Common support. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
Summing up, on the basis of the PSM estimates developed in this section, we can reject the full 
crowding-out hypothesis for all the countries considered. 
 
4.2 Parametric estimations: OLS and mixed-model system	  
We now present the parametric estimates for the impact of public supports on the total R&D 
intensity. Assuming exogeneity of the treatment variable, the effect of policy support on R&D 
intensity can be estimated by OLS. In case of failure of this assumption, reverse causality or 
simultaneity feedbacks lead to biased parameter estimates and, in particular, may generate an 
upward bias in the estimated effect of the treatment variable18. Accordingly, we consider a recursive 
mixed-process system composed by a linear R&D intensity equation and an additional probit 
equation for R&D support (i.e. the potentially endogenous variable), allowing for simultaneity 
between these two processes19. Simultaneity may be due to unobserved factors affecting both the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Another econometric issue is the potential bias associated with the fact the treatment variable is observed only for 
R&D active firms, and this may exacerbate the impact estimated for this variable on R&D intensity. For each country, 
we test for this possibility by running a one-step Heckman regression for the probability of doing R&D and for the 
R&D intensity equation, finding evidence against the presence of self-selection. For sake of brevity, these auxiliary 
results are not reported but are available on request. 
19Differently from the probit regressions performed for the PSM, we admit the presence of non-linearities in estimating 
the two-equation system, by including the square of investment share in the R&D intensity equation and the square of 
the share of in-house R&D in the equation for R&D support. Non-linear terms increase the predictive capacity of the 
probit model, facilitating the detection of the simultaneity between the firm’s decision to invest in R&D and that to 
participate in R&D support programmes. 
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treatment and the outcome variable and would result in a significant correlation between the 
disturbance terms of the two equations. This recursive system of equations corresponds to the 
dummy endogenous regressor model proposed by Heckman (1978) and allows to account for 
potential endogeneity caused either by observable or unobservable factors. Consistent parameter 
estimates can be obtained by means of a two-step procedure, as in Hussinger (2008); however, 
differently from this work, we use a full information maximum likelihood approach20. 
In order to correctly identify the impact of the potentially endogenous variable (the receipt of public 
support) we need to impose some exclusion restrictions. Despite parameters are theoretically 
identified through the non-linearity of the model, in order to improve identification we follow the 
standard practice to include a set of additional covariates in the probit equation for R&D support 
only. These variables are assumed to directly affect the probability of being publicly supported, 
while they do not have any direct impact on the outcome variable (and can be therefore excluded 
from the R&D intensity equation). We use variables that reflect differences in some institutional 
and structural characteristics of the administrative areas in which the firms are located. The set of 
identification variables (see Table 6 for details) includes: a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm is active in an area classified as convergence region (cf. Section 3.2); an index reflecting the 
institutional quality of the region; the net migration rate; the aging index; the degree of 
accessibility; the number of municipality twins and the number of interregional (cross-border) 
collaborations, both expressed as ratios over regional population. 
 
Table 6: Regional identification variables  
Label Type Description Source 
Migration rate Continuous Net migration rate/population (2001-05) Espon 
Aging index Continuous Ratio between population aged 65 yrs and over 
and population under 14, mean 2007-09 
Espon 
Institutional quality Categorical Quality of regional governance (survey on 
citizens’ satisfaction of regional services), 
2009-2010 
Charron et al. 
(2011) 
Convergence region Dummy GDP p.c. less than 75% of the EU average in 
2004 
European 
Commission 
Interregional cooperations Continuous Number of project partners participating in 
Interreg IIIB and IIIC projects/ population (in 
logs), 2008 
Espon 
Twin municipalities Continuous Number of twin agreements with foreign 
municipalities/population (in logs), 2012 
Espon 
Accessibility Continuous Multi-modal potential accessibility, 
standardized index (EU average= 100), 2006  
Espon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Estimation of the recursive mixed-process model has been carried out using the Conditional Mixed Process (cmp) Stata 
module by Roodman (2011). Empirical results do not significantly change if we use a two-step estimation procedure. 
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The rationale behind the use of such variables is that the more dynamic and attractive the region 
(i.e. with a positive net immigration rate, a low aging rate and good infrastructures), and the higher 
the governance quality (in terms of managed funds, ability to establish partnerships, etc.), the higher 
is the probability for a firm to receive some public support to R&D. The spirit of this identification 
strategy follows Einiö (2014) who, for a sample of Finnish firms, predicts the probability to 
participate to R&D support programmes by exploiting variation in regional characteristics. In our 
case, this is justified by the fact that, in all the examined countries, public supports to business R&D 
are also provided and managed by regional governments (especially for co-financing the European 
Regional Development Fund; see Section 3.1).  
The validity of the exclusion restrictions that we use is confirmed by the value of the joint Wald test 
for the significance of the additional identification variables in the probit regression, reported at the 
bottom of Table 7. The rejection of the null hypothesis of this test indicates that regional variables 
are good predictors of the probability to be publicly supported,21 ensuring the consistency of the 
Wald test assessing the simultaneity of the errors between equations (Roodman, 2011). This latter 
test assumes the null hypothesis of equation independence (i.e. no endogeneity of the treatment 
variable) and, in case of rejection, system estimates have to be used. Rejection of the hypothesis of 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations indicates that selection on unobservables is 
not relevant, supporting the validity of the results obtained with PSM and OLS (see Cerulli and Potì 
2012b). This hypothesis is rejected only for Spain. The bottom rows of the last column in Table 7 
show that, for this country, the impact estimated for the pair of regional variables is in line with our 
expectations. On the one side, firms located in convergence regions have a lower probability to 
receive public support to R&D (-0.258); on the other, companies active in regions standing out for a 
high quality of governance are more likely to participate R&D public programmes and receive this 
type of support (0.262). 
Table 7 shows that R&D public supports have always a positive and significant effect on the 
intensity of gross R&D expenditure on turnover. The parameter of R&D supports can be regarded 
as ATET (see Cerulli and Potì, 2012b) and hence are comparable with that estimated by means of 
PSM. The magnitude of the treatment effect is quite consistent between these two procedures, albeit 
OLS regression yields slightly smaller coefficients for Italy, the UK and Spain. However, for the 
latter country, when we account for endogeneity between treatment and outcome variables, the 
R&D policy variable turns out to be insignificant and the hypothesis of full crowding-out cannot be 
excluded. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 A further condition to be satisfied is that the excluded identification variables used in the probit model have to be 
uncorrelated with R&D intensity. This condition is evaluated by including such variables in both system equations. We 
find that R&D intensity always remains unaffected by these additional regional indicators  (results available upon request). 
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Table 7: OLS and simultaneous system estimates on R&D intensity 
  FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK SPAIN SPAIN 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS System 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  R&D int. R&D int. R&D int. R&D int. R&D int. R&D int. R&D support 
R&D policy support (ATET) 2.292*** 1.840*** 1.891*** 1.725*** 1.636*** 0.126   
  (0.453) (0.552) (0.415) (0.455) (0.525) (0.989)   
Old age -1.917*** -1.085*** -0.536 0.679* -0.699 -0.669 0.0420 
  (0.477) (0.410) (0.389) (0.393) (0.485) (0.481) (0.0870) 
Size_class (cat.) -1.121*** -0.366 -1.708*** -1.431*** -1.641*** -1.401*** 0.434*** 
  (0.283) (0.263) (0.360) (0.335) (0.377) (0.409) (0.084) 
Individual holder 0.579 -0.562 0.930* -0.165 -0.184 -0.204 -0.057 
  (0.378) (0.569) (0.507) (0.493) (0.631) (0.624) (0.102) 
Quality certification 0.735 -0.184 0.307 -0.0482 -0.707 -0.531 0.339*** 
  (0.476) (0.383) (0.380) (0.461) (0.537) (0.526) (0.098) 
Foreign group -0.229 -0.927 1.546 -1.011* -1.488* -1.444* 0.0974 
  (0.529) (0.716) (1.156) (0.599) (0.892) (0.877) (0.197) 
National group -0.632 -0.653 0.376 -1.006* -1.844*** -1.708*** 0.227* 
  (0.433) (0.659) (0.582) (0.519) (0.618) (0.620) (0.132) 
Investment/Sales (%) 0.165*** 0.384*** 0.273*** 0.256*** 0.393*** 0.393*** -0.0004 
  (0.034) (0.046) (0.035) (0.057) (0.041) (0.041) (0.003) 
(Investment/Sales)^2 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.0027*** -0.0022* -0.0034*** -0.003***   
  (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Exporter 0.772* 1.169*** 0.787 1.080** 0.188 0.325 0.272** 
  (0.401) (0.415) (0.490) (0.462) (0.591) (0.589) (0.109) 
Graduated employees 0.062** 0.138*** 0.0298 0.0599*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.002 
  (0.025) (0.020) (0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.004) 
Credit constraint 0.286 1.708 1.425* 7.174* -0.601 -0.679 -0.121 
  (1.468) (1.486) (0.801) (4.304) (0.642) (0.639) (0.160) 
Bank credit 0.0583 -0.994** -0.347 -0.296 -0.470 -0.309 -0.0747 
  (0.420) (0.420) (0.376) (0.384) (0.532) (0.515) (0.108) 
In-house R&D (%) 0.011** -0.005 0.013 0.016** -0.002 0.002 0.087 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.097) 
In-house R&D^2 
     
  -0.0002*** 
  
     
  (0.0001) 
Price taker -0.464 -1.377*** -0.423 0.177 -1.176*** -1.125*** 0.007 
  (0.344) (0.341) (0.366) (0.389) (0.429) (0.428) (0.153) 
Sales' reduction 0.0120 -0.323 0.145 -0.335 -0.222 -0.282 0.0291*** 
  (0.394) (0.376) (0.431) (0.388) (0.576) (0.578) (0.008) 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 1.025** 0.714** 0.498 -0.770 0.281 0.350 -0.089 
  (0.419) (0.344) (1.044) (0.685) (0.677) (0.674) (0.299) 
Regional TFP -0.008 4.736*** 0.831 2.587 -0.499 -0.522 0.324*** 
  (1.789) (1.645) (1.388) (1.807) (1.560) (1.550) (0.095) 
Constant 2.981*** 1.950** 4.961*** 5.598*** 7.231*** 7.161*** -1.405*** 
  (1.076) (0.955) (1.568) (1.360) (1.376) (1.372) (0.298) 
  
     
    
Observations 1,488 1,539 1,644 1,040 1,195 1195 
R-squared 0.165 0.269 0.112 0.189 0.215     
Log-pseudolikelihood         -4503.3 
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Table 7 (continued): Diagnostics on system estimates (total sample) 
  FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK SPAIN SPAIN 
  
      
R&D 
support 
Joint Wald test of significance of identification 
variables [P-value] [0.06] [0.00] [0.12] [0.04] [0.08]     
Wald Test of equation independence  
(H0=no simultaneity) [P-value] [0.13] [0.80] [0.84] [0.50] [0.01]     
      
    
Identification variables      
  
 
Twin muni-
cipalities  
Interregional 
cooperations 
Aging 
index 
Accessi-
bility 
Convergence 
region     
 
Migration 
rate 
Migration 
rate 
Institutional 
quality 
Migration 
rate 
Institutional 
quality     
Estimated impact of identification variables 
      
  Convergence region        -0.258**   
     
  (0.123) 
Institutional quality 
    
  0.262** 
             (0.127) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates use sample weights. Cols. (1)-(5) are based on OLS. Cols. (6)-(7) are based on the 
simultaneous mixed-process system. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
      
 
Looking at the other determinants of R&D performance, there is widespread evidence that smaller 
firms are more intensively engaged in formal research than larger firms, once they overcome the 
standard barriers to R&D. In France and Germany, this effect adds to a higher R&D effort of young 
and medium-aged firms. Another firm characteristic that appears to diffusely raise research 
engagement is the intensity of investment in machinery and equipment and the share of graduate 
workers. The latter variable turns out to be insignificant only in Italy, whereas it has a relatively 
strong effect on R&D intensity in Germany. The impact of the other explanatory factors is in 
accordance with our expectations (e.g. direct exporters, firms with a greater share of in-house R&D, 
or located in a research-intensive region exhibit a higher share of R&D expenses on total sales), 
even though they are not always significant.  
 
5. Testing the additionality of public subsidies 
The analysis performed in the previous section was confined to test whether there were no 
significant differences between the R&D intensity of the firms that benefitted from public supports 
(either direct subsidies or fiscal incentives) and that of non-supported firms. For all countries, we 
refused the hypothesis of full crowding-out. A further important step is that of assessing whether 
the receipt of public subsidies increased the amount of privately-funded R&D expenditures. To test 
the additionality (or crowding-in) hypothesis it is necessary to know the amount of R&D subsidies 
received by each supported firm. Assuming that public funds to R&D correspond to direct 
subsidies, we compute the intensity of “privately-funded” R&D expenditures on total sales. Then, 
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we compare the private R&D intensity (net of public subsidies) of subsidized firms with that of 
firms not receiving any kind of public supports22. 
Table 8 shows the number of firms reporting public subsidies for R&D and the percentage of these 
firms on those benefiting from public supports (either subsidies or fiscal incentives). The highest 
percentage of subsidized firms is recorded in Germany, followed by Spain and France. The large 
differences arising among these countries are not surprising if one considers that fiscal incentives to 
R&D are not provided in Germany, while they are extensively used in France and Spain. 
Surprisingly, only 15% and 12% of the supported firms indicates the amount of public subsidies 
received in Italy and the UK, suggesting that in these countries firms widely under-reported R&D 
subsidies. 
 
Table 8:Number and percentage of firms reporting public subsidies  
  France  Germany Italy Spain UK Total 
Firms with R&D supports 550 268 568 495 292 2173 
Firms reporting R&D subsidies 139 87 89 147 36 498 
Percentage of firms with R&D 
subsidies on supported firms 
25.27 32.46 15.67 29.70 12.33 22.92 
 
To compare the effect of public subsidies both on total and privately-funded R&D we first perform 
a PSM analysis. We predict the probability of receiving R&D public subsidies with a Probit 
regression using the same explanatory variables used in Section 3.2. The propensity scores obtained 
by this estimation are used to match each subsidized unit with a firm not receiving any kind of 
support23. Due to the low number of firms reporting the amount of R&D subsidies, the matching 
procedure is performed by imposing only a common support (i.e., we do not apply any caliper). 
For the treated and matched units, Table 9 reports the mean share of total and privately-funded 
R&D expenditures, as well as the mean differences which represent the ATET. The total R&D 
intensity of subsidized firms is always significantly (and remarkably) higher than for non-supported 
firms. On the other hand, when the private R&D intensity is considered, the mean differences are 
never statistically significant. Accordingly, although these findings confirm the absence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In order to get this information we exploit the answers to a specific question included in the EFIGE questionnaire: 
“How have R&D activities been financed on average in the last three years (2007-2009)?”. Among the possible items, 
we considered the share of public funds on total R&D expenditures. Firms that benefited from R&D supports but did 
not report public funds are excluded from the analysis. In fact they cannot belong to the treated group but, at the same 
time, should not be included among the control group (also because some of them, although having received R&D 
subsidies, might have not reported their amounts).   
23 The results of such probit regressions, as well as the mean differences of the explanatory variables before and after 
the matching, are not reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.  
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crowding-out (either full or partial), we find that public subsidies did not stimulate the recipient 
firms to spend additional (own) resources on R&D.  
 
Table 9: Share of R&D expenditures on total sales: mean differences after the matching	  
 
  
Firms with 
R&D subsidy  
Firms without 
R&D supports ATET 
France (n=139) Total R&D intensity 
Private R&D intensity  
8.410 
5.444 
5.151 
5.151 
3.259*** 
0.293 
Germany (n=87) Total R&D intensity 
Private R&D intensity 
10.230 
6.695 
5.920 
5.920 
4.310*** 
0.775 
Italy (n=88) Total R&D intensity 
Private R&D intensity 
8.648 
5.305 
5.739 
5.739 
2.909*** 
-0.433 
Spain (n=147) Total R&D intensity 
Private R&D intensity 
8.245 
5.395 
4.497 
4.497 
3.748*** 
0.899 
UK (n=35) Total R&D intensity 
Private R&D intensity 
8.343 
5.939 
4.686 
4.686 
3.657*** 
1.253 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
Consistent results arise from parametric estimations. In this part of the analysis, we rely only on the 
OLS procedure as yielding estimates more stable than those generated by the simultaneous system, 
probably due to the relatively low number of treated firms. Results in Table 10 indicate that direct 
granting raised the overall firm effort in research activities, as the treatment variable is positively 
and significantly related to the gross measure of R&D intensity. The estimated ATET for France is 
around 4, which is moderately higher than the value obtained with the PSM (3.3). By contrast, for 
all the other countries, OLS estimates for the ATET are below those yielded by the matching 
procedure. Notice that, irrespectively of the adopted estimation technique and the country 
considered, the ATET on gross R&D intensity is remarkably larger than the one estimated in the 
previous section (see Tables 5 and 7). It suggests that direct subsidies were particularly effective in 
enhancing total R&D effort, more than other forms of public support.  
However, the receipt of R&D subsidies turns out to be insignificantly associated with the intensity 
of private R&D expenditures. Accordingly, OLS estimates confirm the rejection of the additionality 
hypothesis. For Italy, we even find a negative impact of subsidies on private R&D, pointing to a 
partial crowding-out of R&D subsidies, albeit this effect is significant at a 10% only. 
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Table 10: OLS estimates on total and private R&D intensity of firms with R&D subsidies 
 
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK SPAIN 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Total 
R&D int. 
Private 
R&D int. 
Total 
R&D int. 
Private 
R&D int. 
Total 
R&D int. 
Private 
R&D int. 
Total 
R&D int. 
Private 
R&D int. 
Total 
R&D int. 
Private 
R&D int. 
R&D subsidy (ATET) 4.056*** 1.043 3.223*** -0.446 2.245** -1.280* 2.165** -0.0585 3.039*** -0.162 
  (1.046) (0.899) (1.004) (0.667) (0.909) (0.712) (0.996) (0.909) (0.919) (0.786) 
Old age -1.701*** -1.415*** -0.762* -0.603 -0.292 -0.351 0.932** 0.905** -0.518 -0.467 
 
(0.520) (0.486) (0.438) (0.411) (0.437) (0.433) (0.428) (0.427) (0.578) (0.556) 
Size (categorical) -0.724** -0.450 -0.308 -0.225 -1.144** -0.931** -1.141*** -1.068*** -1.378*** -1.028** 
  (0.313) (0.289) (0.278) (0.270) (0.463) (0.448) (0.382) (0.384) (0.525) (0.490) 
Individual holder 0.728* 0.906** -0.221 -0.0448 1.339** 1.085* -0.231 -0.212 0.115 -0.125 
 
(0.436) (0.397) (0.577) (0.554) (0.584) (0.574) (0.592) (0.583) (0.759) (0.748) 
Quality certification 0.884* 0.741 -0.102 -0.0882 0.580 0.485 0.370 0.421 -0.716 -0.670 
  (0.517) (0.481) (0.401) (0.370) (0.425) (0.418) (0.500) (0.500) (0.616) (0.596) 
Foreign group 0.0491 -0.00461 -1.163 -0.802 2.671* 2.464* -0.400 -0.421 -0.946 -0.823 
  (0.629) (0.580) (0.725) (0.695) (1.393) (1.396) (0.711) (0.708) (1.297) (1.279) 
National group -0.453 -0.526 -0.498 -0.131 0.719 0.483 -0.852 -0.811 -2.320*** -1.856*** 
 
(0.488) (0.449) (0.698) (0.690) (0.680) (0.667) (0.640) (0.637) (0.735) (0.668) 
Investment/Sales (%) 0.144*** 0.132*** 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.223*** 0.229*** 0.280*** 0.268*** 0.428*** 0.403*** 
  (0.0361) (0.0328) (0.0477) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0384) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0451) (0.0443) 
(Investment/Sales)^2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0029*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter 0.705* 0.707* 0.902** 0.612 0.407 0.296 0.959** 0.906* 0.269 0.211 
  (0.423) (0.406) (0.435) (0.420) (0.537) (0.534) (0.481) (0.485) (0.662) (0.629) 
Graduated employees 0.0410 0.0300 0.139*** 0.139*** -0.0242 -0.0248 0.0454** 0.0422** 0.0679** 0.0576* 
 
(0.0331) (0.0293) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0324) (0.0302) 
Credit constraint -0.693 -0.737 1.847 1.738 1.140 1.247 8.206* 7.366 -0.664 -0.615 
  (1.666) (1.435) (1.588) (1.504) (0.926) (0.915) (4.516) (4.554) (0.732) (0.708) 
Bank credit 0.164 0.0946 -0.947** -0.876** -0.250 -0.251 -0.440 -0.449 -0.530 -0.462 
 
(0.480) (0.445) (0.454) (0.430) (0.435) (0.424) (0.439) (0.437) (0.632) (0.614) 
In-house R&D (%) 0.0111* 0.00910* -0.00124 0.0004 0.0155 0.0196** 0.0165** 0.0164** 0.00135 -0.00746 
 
(0.00587) (0.00535) (0.00821) (0.007) (0.00984) (0.00974) (0.00713) (0.00712) (0.00957) (0.00887) 
Price taker -0.813** -0.669* -1.268*** -1.071*** -0.769* -0.633 0.211 0.212 -1.297** -1.094** 
  (0.396) (0.369) (0.363) (0.342) (0.413) (0.407) (0.446) (0.445) (0.512) (0.483) 
Sales reduction 0.280 0.180 -0.386 -0.367 0.276 0.152 -0.401 -0.441 0.0893 0.389 
 
(0.435) (0.414) (0.394) (0.379) (0.460) (0.456) (0.447) (0.445) (0.674) (0.629) 
Regional R&D intensity 
(%) 0.852* 0.768* 0.873** 0.821** 0.436 0.747 -0.977 -0.759 0.495 0.766 
  (0.451) (0.409) (0.359) (0.331) (1.177) (1.159) (0.731) (0.732) (0.800) (0.789) 
Regional TFP -0.561 -0.139 5.094*** 4.712*** 0.917 0.658 3.535* 2.776 0.297 -0.228 
 
(1.937) (1.770) (1.708) (1.573) (1.431) (1.404) (2.098) (2.096) (1.758) (1.719) 
Constant 2.802** 2.655** 1.655 1.599* 3.971** 3.678** 4.261*** 4.005*** 5.751*** 4.987*** 
 
(1.303) (1.192) (1.036) (0.955) (1.747) (1.711) (1.521) (1.514) (1.701) (1.638) 
   
    
  
    
  
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,358 1,358 1,165 1,165 784 784 847 847 
R-squared 0.165 0.101 0.243 0.239 0.090 0.084 0.165 0.147 0.246 0.219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS Estimates based on sample weights. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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As surveyed in Section 2, there are few similar studies testing the hypothesis of additionality of 
R&D subsidies. González and Pazó (2008) found a result consistent with our estimates for a sample 
of Spanish firms over a period between 1990 and 1999. On the contrary, Duguet (2004) and 
Carboni (2011) provide evidence supporting the additionality hypothesis, respectively for a sample 
of French and Italian firms. Similarly, Hussinger (2008) estimates that, in Germany, €1 of R&D 
public funding led to €1 additional private R&D spending between 1990 and 2000. Evidence in 
favour of the additionality of R&D subsidies for SMEs in Germany is provided by Hud and 
Hussinger (2014) for the period 2006-2010. However, these authors show that the effect of this 
policy instrument in 2009, albeit positive, is significantly smaller than in previous years, probably 
as the financial crisis discouraged subsidized firms to increase their own private funds to R&D. The 
same consideration might explain why, for the period under assessment in our paper (2007-2009), 
we do not find evidence for the additionality of R&D subsidies on private R&D intensity. 
 
6.Testing the effectiveness of fiscal incentives in France and Spain 
As a last step of the work, we evaluate the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. This part of the 
analysis is limited to France and Spain as, for these countries, we have a sufficiently high number of 
firms reporting the nature of the R&D support received. Firms exploiting R&D fiscal incentives are 
identified as those indicating to benefit from R&D public supports but not reporting the amount of 
R&D grants received24. This indirect procedure of identification might lead to biased estimates as 
long as the propensity to under-report R&D subsidies is correlated with some firm characteristics 
that we are unable to account for. This imposes some caution in interpreting the results of this 
section. Though, despite such caveats, this analysis is extremely useful as permitting to calculate the 
increase in R&D expenses induced by fiscal incentives. Moreover, for France, we can compare the 
R&D increment with the official amount of fiscal provisions awarded to R&D active firms in the 
year 2009. By this exercise, we are able to relate our findings to the wide literature focused on 
estimation of the effect of R&D tax credit on research engagement (see Section 2).  
In the remaining of this section, we first present the estimated value for the ATET obtained with 
PSM and parametric regression procedures. Then, for France, we quantify the multiplicative effect 
of R&D tax credits by checking whether the policy-induced increase in private R&D (i.e. the policy 
benefits) exceeds the amount of foregone tax revenues (the policy costs). 
Table 11 reports the values for the ATET yielded by the PSM analysis. On average, the estimated 
impact is considerably larger for France than for Spain. For the former country, the ATET ranges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24Germany is excluded as this country does not provide fiscal incentives to business R&D, whilst Italy and the UK 
because of the wide number of firms under-reporting R&D grants (see the discussion above). 	  
	  
	  
25	  
from 1.9 (when no restriction is imposed on the common support) to 1.51 (when we set a caliper of 
0.005). The impact of tax incentives is always significant at the highest level of confidence. For 
Spain25, there is weaker evidence on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives and we cannot exclude 
the crowding-out effect of this policy instrument. Indeed, albeit the parameter size does not change 
remarkably among specifications (from 1.1 to 0.9), the significance of the ATET reduces as long as 
we impose stricter restrictions on the matching. The R&D policy variable turns out to be 
insignificant when the caliper is set to 0.005.  
 
Table 11: Fiscal incentives and share of R&D expenditures on total sales:  
mean differences after the matching 
  
Firms with 
R&D fiscal 
incentives 
Firms 
without 
R&D 
supports ATET 
FRANCE 
Common support (Cs) (n=405) 6.346 4.442 1.904*** 
Cs + caliper 0.008 (n=371) 5.921 4.418 1.504*** 
Cs + caliper 0.005 (n=367) 5.954 4.444 1.510*** 
 SPAIN 
Common support (n=348) 6.793 5.690 1.103** 
Cs + caliper 0.008 (n=321) 6.903 5.934 0.969* 
Cs + caliper 0.005 (n=307) 7.010 6.065 0.944 
*** p<0.01, ***p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Parametric estimates are illustrated in Table 12. The relatively high number of treated firms for the 
countries under assessment enables us to account for the potential endogeneity of the treatment 
variable. This task is accomplished following the same strategy adopted in Section 4.2. In other 
words, we estimate the empirical model with both OLS and the mixed-process system, and report 
the latter results only when the regional identification variables are jointly significant in the 
equation for the R&D support and the null hypothesis of the Wald test on equations’ independence 
is rejected. As in Section 4.2, endogeneity of the R&D policy variable emerges only for Spain. For 
this country, after controlling for simultaneity issues, there is no evidence that fiscal incentives 
raised private R&D expenses. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In order to improve the matching between treated and matched firms, the Probit regression used for this country in the 
PSM analysis adds the square of the investment-sales ratio to the set of explanatory variables used in previous sections. 
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Table 12: OLS and simultaneous system estimates on firms benefiting from R&D tax credit 
 
FRANCE SPAIN SPAIN 
 
OLS OLS System 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES R&D int. R&D int. R&D int. R&D tax credit 
R&D tax credit (ATET) 1.682*** 1.085** -0.467   
  (0.418) (0.537) (0.937)   
Old age -1.432*** -0.522 -0.520 -0.006 
  (0.394) (0.506) (0.502) (0.095) 
Size (categorical) -0.951*** -1.943*** -1.707*** 0.406*** 
  (0.276) (0.406) (0.424) (0.092) 
Individual holder 0.847** -0.460 -0.460 -0.018 
  (0.374) (0.678) (0.671) (0.111) 
Quality certification 0.478 -0.728 -0.548 0.372*** 
  (0.371) (0.547) (0.531) (0.105) 
Foreign group -0.513 -1.030 -0.905 0.236 
  (0.507) (0.924) (0.914) (0.204) 
National group -0.611 -1.500** -1.426** 0.106 
  (0.414) (0.685) (0.681) (0.147) 
Investment/Sales (%) 0.148*** 0.397*** 0.397*** -0.001 
  (0.0349) (0.0418) (0.0414) (0.003) 
(Investment/Sales)^2 -0.001*** -0.0037*** -0.0037***   
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Exporter 0.720* 0.454 0.583 0.276** 
  (0.397) (0.578) (0.576) (0.120) 
Graduated employees 0.069** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.004 
  (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.004) 
Credit constraint -0.232 -0.641 -0.695 -0.0802 
  (1.568) (0.684) (0.682) (0.180) 
Bank credit -0.167 -0.229 -0.0979 0.279*** 
  (0.345) (0.526) (0.510) (0.102) 
In-house R&D (%) 0.007 -0.007 -0.004 0.028*** 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
In-house R&D^2 
  
  -0.0003** 
  
  
  (0.0001) 
Price taker -0.169 -0.958** -0.924** 0.0580 
  (0.318) (0.441) (0.442) (0.107) 
Sales' reduction 0.176 0.160 0.113 -0.0637 
  (0.381) (0.617) (0.618) (0.118) 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 0.609** 0.109 0.179 0.00365 
  (0.285) (0.710) (0.707) (0.171) 
Regional TFP 2.032 0.0196 0.164 0.264 
  (1.239) (1.680) (1.669) (0.328) 
Constant 3.497*** 7.079*** 6.951*** -1.538*** 
  (0.991) (1.368) (1.361) (0.329) 
  
  
    
Observations 1,349 1,048 1048 
R-squared 0.139 0.203     
Log-pseudolikelihood 0.139 0.203 -3950.36 
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Table 12 (continued): OLS and simultaneous system estimates on firms benefiting from R&D 
tax credit 
 FRANCE SPAIN SPAIN 
Joint Wald test of significance of identification 
variables [P-value] [0.06] [0.04]     
Wald Test of equation independence  
(H0=no simultaneity) [P-value] [0.56] [0.02]     
   
    
Identification variables Interregional cooperation Convergence region     
 Aging index Institutional quality     
Estimated impact of identification variables 
  
  
 Convergence region 
  
  -0.272** 
  
  
  (0.136) 
Institutional quality 
 
  0.238* 
        (0.137) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates based on sample weights. Cols. (1)-(3) use OLS. Cols. (3)-(4) use a simultaneous 
mixed-process system. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Conversely, Table 12 shows that tax incentives were particularly effective to raise privately-funded 
R&D activity in France. Our evidence is therefore consistent with Mulkey and Mairesse (2013) who 
document the boost exerted by the tax credit on R&D expenses after the reform of the related fiscal 
discipline in 2008 (cf. Section 3). For this country, we are able to compare the costs and the 
estimated benefits associated with the fiscal provisions for R&D. First, we compute the impact of 
the ATET as a share of the R&D intensity of treated firms. Then, we multiply this percentage to the 
base of R&D expenditures claimed by French companies to obtain tax credits (source: French 
Ministry of Education and Research). The resulting value should be informative about the 
expansion of the volume of R&D that can be ascribed to fiscal incentives. Finally, we take the ratio 
between this value and the amount of tax credits awarded to claimant firms. If this ratio is greater 
than one it implies that R&D policy had multiplicative effects as the foregone tax revenue was more 
than compensated by the increase in R&D expenses. 
 
Table 13: Simulations of costs and benefits of R&D tax credits in France, 2009 
 ATET Avg. 
R&D 
intensity 
of treated 
firms 
ATET on 
R&D 
intensity 
 
R&D  
expenses 
claimed  
for tax 
credits* 
Amount 
of tax 
credits* 
Estimated  
R&D 
increase due 
to tax credits 
R&D 
policy 
multiplier 
 (1) (2) (3)=(1)/(2) (4) (5) (6)=(3)*(5) (7)=(6)/(5) 
        
Common support (Cs) (n=405) 1.904 6.346 0.300 16,972 4,726 5,092 1.077 
Cs + caliper 0.008 (n=371) 1.504 5.921 0.254 16,972 4,726 4,311 0.912 
Cs + caliper 0.005 (n=367) 1.510 5.954 0.254 16,972 4,726 4,304 0.911 
OLS 1.682 6.346 0.265 16,972 4,726 4,498 0.952 
* Source: Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche (2011). 
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 13. In the first column, we report the ATET 
estimated above by means of PSM and OLS. By expressing these values as ratios to the R&D 
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intensity of treated firms, the policy-induced increase in R&D ranges between 25.4 and 30% (see 
column 3). According to the data provided by the French Ministry of Education and Research, the 
base of R&D declared for tax credits was €16,972 million in 2009 and the overall value of tax 
credits acknowledged to French firms was €4,726m. The increase in R&D expenses due to the 
favourable fiscal treatment is estimated to range from €4,304 to €5,092m, depending on the 
specification used as reference (column 6). In the light of such estimates, the multiplier of fiscal 
incentives is found to range between 1.08 and 0.91 (column 7). These figures are really valuable for 
a twofold reason. First, we are assuming that the effect of R&D tax credits materialises in one year 
(or equivalently that there are no additional increases in R&D induced by the public policy after 
2009); second, we do not account for knowledge spillovers associated with the expansion of R&D. 
Our findings are in line with the results of earlier studies. By estimating the effect of tax incentives 
on the user cost of R&D capital, Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) compute the ratio between the 
simulated increase in R&D investment due to the tax credit introduced in 2008 in France and the 
associated budgetary cost, finding a multiplier of around 0.7. 
Finally, to better map our results into the literature, we infer a measure of the elasticity of R&D 
expenses with respect to tax incentives from our estimation results. It should be borne in mind that 
the ATET represents the increase in R&D intensity experienced by French firms as a result of fiscal 
incentives. Hence, by multiplying this value with the ratio between the share of treated firms in the 
sample and their average R&D intensity, one can resume a rough elasticity of R&D to the fiscal 
treatment. In our case, this elasticity fluctuates between 0.09 and 0.11, which is comparable to that 
estimated in previous studies. For instance, Duguet (2012) performs a similar analysis finding an 
elasticity that ranges from 0.05 to 0.12, whilst Bloom et al. (2002) estimate for France a parameter 
for R&D tax price of 0.11 in the short run (and 0.8 in the long run). 
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have exploited data from a survey conducted on comparable samples of 
manufacturing firms from the largest EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) to 
perform a micro-econometric evaluation of the effectiveness of R&D public policies. The analysis 
has been carried separately for each country, so to account for (and identify) the wide differences 
existing in the public provisions for R&D and in the quality of bodies administering R&D support 
programs. Beneficiaries of R&D supports are unevenly distributed across countries, due to the fact 
that R&D subsidies and tax credits were both used extensively in countries like Spain and France 
between 2007 and 2009, while tax allowances for R&D expenditure were not provided in Germany.  
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The analysis has been developed in three steps and used different procedures to account for the 
most relevant econometric issues involved in policy evaluation (selectivity, simultaneity, etc.). We 
have distinguished firms on the basis of whether they received direct funding or exploited tax 
incentives to R&D (treatment variable). By considering two measures of outcome, namely gross 
and net R&D expenditure on sales, we have been able to test the hypothesis of full crowding-out 
(i.e. R&D policy increases the gross research intensity) and the hypothesis of crowding-
in/additionality (i.e. R&D policy increases net research intensity).  
In the first step of the analysis, we have found strong evidence against the hypothesis of full 
crowding-out for all countries except Spain, for which simultaneity is detected between treatment 
and outcome variable.  
As a second step, we have shown that public subsidies are positively correlated with gross R&D 
intensity, but they have not induced firms to spend additional (own) resources on R&D. Therefore, 
the hypothesis of additionality of R&D subsidies has to be rejected. This is at odds with the results 
of some previous studies, but could be due to the fact that our outcome variable, which is an 
average of the values for the years between 2007 and 2009, reflects the effect of the financial crisis 
and the subsequent downturn. Probably, in response to the crisis, subsidized firms cut or postponed 
their investment plans so that, contrary to what occurred in previous years, these companies did not 
undertake additional R&D expenditures.  
The third step of the analysis has shown that in France the R&D tax credit exerted a positive impact 
on business R&D. For this country, we have also calculated the (short-run) multiplier of fiscal 
incentives to R&D, which is around the unity, in line with earlier works. 
All in all, our analysis has shown that, albeit ineffective to raise private funds for research, public 
supports to R&D were not used opportunistically by EU firms to reduce their own efforts. 
Therefore, R&D subsidies and tax incentives were effective to avoid a marked drop in business 
R&D during the financial turmoil. 
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APPENDIX 
Mean differences of the observable characteristics and the outcome variable (R&D intensity) before 
and after matching (by imposing common support and a 0.005 caliper)  
 
 
Table A.1 - France 
 
  
 
Before Matching 
 
After matching 
  
 
Supported 
(N=550) 
Unsupported 
(N=938) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Supported 
(N=509) 
Unsupported 
(N=509) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Old age 0.702 0.686 0.511 0.703 0.684 0.497 
Size class (cat.) 1.727 1.356 0.000 1.662 1.656 0.897 
Individual holder 0.456 0.662 0.000 0.475 0.460 0.616 
Quality certification 0.680 0.537 0.000 0.658 0.654 0.895 
Foreign group 0.215 0.126 0.000 0.204 0.193 0.638 
National group 0.289 0.237 0.025 0.277 0.324 0.101 
Investment/Sales (%) 7.356 8.474 0.099 7.478 9.262 0.045 
Exporter 0.891 0.721 0.000 0.882 0.862 0.348 
Graduated employees (%) 5.569 1.167 0.000 3.267 2.595 0.289 
Credit constraint 0.029 0.016 0.088 0.029 0.033 0.720 
Bank credit 0.404 0.337 0.010 0.401 0.411 0.750 
In-house R&D (%) 49.533 49.267 0.850 49.334 47.774 0.349 
Price taker 0.460 0.417 0.105 0.450 0.493 0.168 
Sales’ reduction 0.684 0.720 0.141 0.694 0.705 0.682 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 1.416 1.329 0.014 1.389 1.364 0.548 
Regional TFP 0.041 0.026 0.069 0.035 0.034 0.962 
R&D intensity 6.887 4.744 0.000 6.695 4.901 0.000 
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Table A.2 - Germany 
 
Before Matching 
 
After matching 
   
 
Supported 
(N=268) 
Unsupported 
(N=1271) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Supported 
(N=256) 
Unsupported 
(N=256) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Old age 0.470 0.671 0.000 0.488 0.488 1.000 
Size class (cat.) 1.687 1.621 0.179 1.684 1.758 0.261 
Individual holder 0.765 0.784 0.483 0.762 0.766 0.917 
Quality certification 0.799 0.733 0.026 0.797 0.758 0.289 
Foreign group 0.067 0.084 0.354 0.070 0.082 0.618 
National group 0.116 0.107 0.679 0.117 0.102 0.572 
Investment/Sales (%) 13.065 11.169 0.020 12.756 13.385 0.621 
Exporter 0.854 0.807 0.070 0.848 0.867 0.528 
Graduated employees (%) 8.601 6.783 0.061 8.144 8.934 0.592 
Credit constraint 0.029 0.020 0.296 0.031 0.020 0.400 
Bank credit 0.284 0.228 0.053 0.277 0.270 0.843 
In-house R&D (%) 21.638 10.387 0.000 19.996 21.699 0.581 
Price taker 0.384 0.400 0.641 0.398 0.391 0.857 
Sales’ reduction 0.675 0.655 0.531 0.680 0.695 0.704 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 1.308 1.422 0.001 1.333 1.349 0.724 
Regional TFP 0.183 0.252 0.000 0.192 0.206 0.239 
Convergence region 0.340 0.117 0.000 0.316 0.277 0.334 
R&D intensity 9.381 7.006 0.000 9.184 7.574 0.050 
 
 
Table A.3 - Italy 
 
Before Matching 
  
After matching 
   
 
Supported 
(N=568) 
Unsupported 
(N=1076) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Supported 
(N=549) 
Unsupported 
(N=549) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Old age 0.664 0.645 0.448 0.658 0.650 0.800 
Size_class (cat.) 1.488 1.246 0.000 1.446 1.441 0.892 
Individual holder 0.727 0.777 0.025 0.736 0.745 0.731 
Quality certification 0.695 0.600 0.000 0.692 0.687 0.845 
Foreign group 0.051 0.046 0.679 0.051 0.040 0.386 
National group 0.218 0.152 0.001 0.202 0.230 0.272 
Investment/Sales (%) 8.843 9.514 0.228 8.952 9.349 0.526 
Exporter 0.882 0.823 0.002 0.878 0.869 0.650 
Graduated employees (%) 2.396 1.220 0.002 1.955 1.490 0.294 
Bank credit 0.708 0.578 0.000 0.699 0.723 0.387 
In-house R&D (%) 14.854 7.839 0.000 14.002 12.534 0.378 
Price taker 0.377 0.336 0.095 0.375 0.395 0.496 
Sales’ reduction 0.748 0.746 0.931 0.743 0.721 0.414 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 0.993 0.981 0.208 0.992 0.989 0.790 
Regional TFP -0.144 -0.153 0.198 -0.145 -0.145 0.997 
Convergence region 0.065 0.084 0.182 0.067 0.071 0.812 
R&D intensity 7.769 6.243 0.000 7.885 5.770 0.000 
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Table A.4 - Spain 
 
Before Matching 
  
After matching  
  
 
Supported 
(N=495) 
Unsupported 
(N=708) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Supported 
(N=451) 
Unsupported 
(N=451) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Old age 0.612 0.544 0.020 0.599 0.596 0.946 
Size class (cat.) 1.578 1.189 0.000 1.477 1.503 0.555 
Individual holder 0.596 0.720 0.000 0.630 0.579 0.118 
Quality certification 0.810 0.649 0.000 0.794 0.800 0.804 
Foreign group 0.103 0.047 0.000 0.095 0.102 0.738 
National group 0.208 0.103 0.000 0.188 0.200 0.674 
Investment/Sales (%) 13.063 14.819 0.056 13.251 12.754 0.600 
Investment/Sales* Size_class 19.307 16.699 0.041 18.381 17.525 0.554 
Exporter 0.859 0.737 0.000 0.845 0.843 0.927 
Graduated employees (%) 5.642 3.021 0.000 4.951 4.357 0.470 
Bank credit 0.733 0.651 0.003 0.721 0.681 0.191 
In-house R&D (%) 11.657 4.550 0.000 9.186 9.854 0.677 
Price taker 0.283 0.233 0.051 0.271 0.239 0.285 
Sales’ reduction 0.802 0.809 0.788 0.805 0.780 0.367 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 1.140 1.080 0.009 1.139 1.061 0.002 
Regional TFP -0.065 -0.091 0.011 -0.067 -0.092 0.032 
Convergence region 0.182 0.263 0.001 0.191 0.228 0.165 
R&D intensity 7.222 6.809 0.348 7.430 5.539 0.000 
 
Table A.5 - UK 
 
Before Matching 
  
After matching 
   
  
Supported 
(N=292) 
Unsupported 
(N=748) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Supported 
(N=280) 
Unsupported 
(N=280) 
P-value of 
T-test 
Old age 0.647 0.585 0.068 0.650 0.621 0.483 
Size_class (cat.) 1.490 1.408 0.052 1.482 1.446 0.482 
Individual holder 0.736 0.770 0.252 0.739 0.789 0.164 
Quality certification 0.736 0.691 0.152 0.732 0.668 0.097 
Foreign group 0.192 0.186 0.825 0.193 0.179 0.664 
National group 0.195 0.123 0.003 0.186 0.153 0.312 
Investment/Sales (%) 7.733 9.064 0.104 7.971 7.152 0.323 
Exporter 0.911 0.773 0.000 0.907 0.914 0.767 
Graduated employees (%) 8.771 4.091 0.000 6.825 6.071 0.546 
Bank credit 0.384 0.305 0.015 0.369 0.357 0.792 
In-house R&D (%) 23.476 16.290 0.002 22.750 21.475 0.669 
Price taker 0.366 0.305 0.056 0.368 0.400 0.435 
Sales’ reduction 0.596 0.612 0.627 0.596 0.593 0.932 
Regional R&D intensity (%) 1.189 1.159 0.139 1.180 1.168 0.639 
Regional TFP -0.042 -0.047 0.569 -0.042 -0.039 0.757 
Convergence region 0.045 0.051 0.674 0.043 0.046 0.838 
R&D intensity 7.418 5.198 0.000 7.254 5.196 0.000 
 
